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Abstract. We propose a topological categorization of agents that makes
use of the multiple-channel logic (MCL) framework, a recently developed
model of reasoning about agents. We firstly introduce a complete formal-
ization of prejudices on agents’ attitudes and propose an extension of the
rules of the MCL framework. We then use RCC-5 (the Region Connection
Calculus) to categorize different agents in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS)
based on the collaboration, competence, and honesty of agents. We dis-
cuss the possibility of using RCC-3 and RCC-8 and generalize our results
to define an upper bound in the number of different types of agents in
MAS. Finally, we apply our topological categorization to a specific MAS
that describes a Cyber-Physical System, for which we define, categorize
and discuss the resulting attack states.
1 Introduction
Much effort has been devoted to the characterization of different agents in Multi-
Agent Systems (MAS), ranging from works that employ Dynamic Epistemic
Logic and Public Announcement Logics (PAL) [13] to more recent approaches
such as [1]. These works have studied an agent’s beliefs and announcements, typi-
cally under the assumption that agents are always truthful and sincere. However,
as discussed in, e.g., [2], this assumption is an oversimplification since most MAS
contain a number of agents that are clearly neither sincere nor truthful. This is,
for instance, the case in the systems that are typically considered in the secu-
rity research community, where dishonest (and thus neither sincere nor truthful)
agents are used to formalize attacks to the systems under consideration. As
a result, a number of research paper have focused their attention to spotting
unintended or even malicious behavior in MAS. We are specifically focused on
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), as samples of such problems, as reported widely
in [11,6], and specifically for an agent-based model of CPS in [7].
Distinguishing between the different types of agents in a MAS is a difficult
task. This is witnessed by the fact that although a characterization of agents
would obviously play a crucial role in the understanding of different aspects and
facets in MAS, a proper definition is still missing. General problems with agency
and norms, namely social regulations, are presented in [3], where many problems
are discussed and left open. Further investigations, including those in Public
Announcement Logic [1] have devised a pathway to follow, with many problems
in the definitions yet open. A step in this direction has been done in [2], which
introduced a general logical framework called Multiple Channel Logic Framework
(MCL). However, the focus of [2] is on the definition of the framework and little
attention is payed to the definition of a general categorization of all the possible
agents that could be defined using MCL.
The overall goal of this paper is the definition of a general categorization of
agents, based on MCL. We focus, in particular, on the application of MAS for
reasoning about security systems, such as Cyber-Physical Systems. More specif-
ically, our contribution is three-fold:
1. We define a topological categorization of agents in MAS, obtaining 50 new
rules in the MCL framework.
2. We identify a theoretical limit to the maximum number of different types of
agents in a MAS (defined using MCL).
3. As an example of a concrete application, we apply our topological catego-
rization to define attack states for a MAS that describes a general CPS. Our
case study ultimately allows us to show that our categorization of agents can
be used to reason on the security of CPS and, more generally, MAS.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on the MCL
framework that we have employed as a basis of our categorization of agents. In
Section 3, we define agents and summarize the Region Connection Calculus. In
Section 4, we propose a categorization of agents for MAS by extending the MCL
framework. We then define an upper bound on the number of different types of
agents in Section 5, and in Section 6, we apply our categorization to the security
of CPS. In Section 7, we take some conclusions.
2 Background: The MCL framework
In this section, we summarize the main features of the Multiple Channel Logic
Framework MCL of [2], which provides the basis for our work in this paper.
2.1 Announcements, Beliefs and Facts
MCL is a logical framework that is able to relate announcements, agents’ beliefs,
and true statements on multiple communication channels, where the channels
of MCL are logical spaces in which agents make public announcements (private
channels are out of the scope of MCL). More specifically, MCL is a three-layered,
labeled, modal logic framework:
– The first layer is a propositional calculus that is used to express what agents
share, i.e., the logical representation of an assertion.
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– The second layer is a multi-modal calculus with three different modalities: B
(belief ), which allows one to assert that an agent believes in a proposition,
and T2 and T3 to state that a given proposition is asserted by an agent
respectively in every channel or at least one channel.
– The third layer is for agent tagging, which defines prejudice about commu-
nicative attitudes of agents (see Section 2.3 for more details).
Propositional formulae in the first layer of MCL are of the form
ϕ := A | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ ,
where A denotes a propositional letter, and ¬, ∧ and ∨ are the standard con-
nectives for negation, conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
Modal formulae in the second layer of MCL are of the form
µ := B[λ : ϕ] | T2[λ : ϕ] | T3[λ : ϕ] | ∼µ
where ϕ denotes a propositional formula, λ an agent and ∼ a negation.
B[λ : ϕ] intuitively means that the agent λ believes in the formula ϕ. Note
that, as is standard, an agent might believe a false formula.
T2[λ : ϕ] intuitively means that the agent λ announces ϕ in every channel.
More formally, when λ announces ϕ in a channel C, then he announces ϕ in any
channel C ′ that is accessible from C. T3 denotes that the agent λ announces
ϕ at least in one channel. In fact, the semantics of MCL relates the notion
of accessibility to the notion of observation: a channel C ′ is accessible from a
channel C when the observer of C also observes C ′. We won’t however go into
the details of the Kripke-style semantics of MCL, which is given in [2], where
the soundness and completeness of MCL are proved.
We can then define the following three sets with respect to an agent λ:
– Announcements Aλ = {ϕ.T3[λ : ϕ]} is the set of formulae announced by λ
in one or more channels.
– Beliefs Bλ = {ϕ.B[λ : ϕ]} is the set of the formulae believed to be true by λ.
– Facts F = {ϕ | σ(ϕ) = >} is the set of true formulae.
2.2 Assumptions on the Agents in MCL
MCL imposes the following assumptions on the agents:
– Atemporal channels: announcements are made in a channel and hold forever.
– Belief revision: if an agent makes two opposite announcements in the same
channel, then the agent has changed his point of view.
– Coherent agents: an agent makes coherent announcements in a single chan-
nel, although he might make opposite announcements in a different channel.
– Consistent agents: an agent either believes in the truthfulness of a statement
or in the truthfulness of the opposite statement, but not in both at once.
– No beliefs: if an agent does not assert something, this doesn’t imply that the
agent believes the opposite.
– Provable facts: there exist provable facts that are not matter of opinions.
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Table 1. Description of different agent types in MCL.
Agent type Notation Description
Weakly Collaborative +(WCl)λ λ announces his beliefs in at least one channel
Strongly Collaborative +(SCl)λ λ announces his beliefs in every channel
Sincere +(S)λ λ who believes every announcement he makes
Competent +(Co)λ Everything believed by λ is true
Omniscient +(O)λ λ believes every true formula
2.3 Different Types of Agents in MCL
In MCL, a number of different tags, called prejudices, are associated to different
types of agents. A tag is defined as α ::= +(X)λ | − (X)λ, where X is the name
of a prejudice associated to an agent λ. A prejudice is the assumption of a direct
dependency between two of three types of logical tokens assertions, beliefs, and
facts in the system for one particular agent. For instance, when we say that an
agent is sincere, we mean that when he makes an assertion, then he has the belief
of that assertion. In detail we introduce the list of the possible combinations in
Section 4. We then have the five agent types given in Table 1. The adjective
weak and strong are only applied to the collaborative prejudice (in MCL) and
differentiate between an agent who asserts what he believes on at least one (i.e.,
T3[λ : ϕ]) or all (i.e., T2[λ : ϕ]) the channels, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows the introduction ([I.]) and elimination ([E.]) rules for prejudice
given in [2]. Note that only negative tags can be derived, i.e., positive tags only
appear in the premises of a rule. This is because the intended meaning of a
positive prejudice can easily be defined in second order logic quantifying on
the formula asserted or believed by an agent. Hence, a positive tag cannot be
introduced after one assertion or belief of an agent, e.g., an agent has to know
any topic discussed to be tagged as competent +(Co). On the other hand, the
existential quantifier characterizing the negative tags allows for the introduction
of negative tags, e.g., if an agent does not know a single topic, he is tagged as
incompetent −(Co). This is not explicitly formalized in [2] and we introduce a
fully-fledged formalization of tags in Section 3. Furthermore, in [2] the weak and
strong adjective are used only for a collaborative agent and, e.g., the rules for
the sincere agent (rules R.36 and R.41 in Fig. 1) only consider assertions in at
least one channel. In our formalization, we consider weak and strong prejudice
for each assertion used in a rule.
3 Agents in MAS
In MCL, agents are defined by using three main components of the framework:
the sets of announcements, beliefs and facts, i.e., Aλ, Bλ and F. A natural step
is to define how many different types of agents can be defined out of these three
sets. To do that, we first extend the results of [2] by considering the relations
between these three sets and then use these relations to define agents in MCL.
Intuitively, we can define the following three relations:
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ϕ + (O)λ
R.32
B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(O)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λ
R.33 ϕ
[E. +(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WCl )λ
R.34
T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl )]
B[λ : ϕ] + (SCl )λ
R.35
T2[λ : ϕ] [E. +(SCl )]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (S)λ
R.36
B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(S)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ϕ
R.37 −(O)λ [I. −(O)]
B[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.38 −(Co)λ [I. −(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 −(WCl )λ
[I. −(WCl )]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.40 −(SCl )λ
[I.−(SCl )]
T3[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.41 −(S)λ [I.−(S)]
Fig. 1. The rules for prejudice in MCL
– Collaboration (Aλ,Bλ) is the relation between beliefs and announcements
of an agent λ. This relation defines the level of collaboration of λ as the
quantity of data an agent announces with respect to the data he believes. For
example, if an agent asserts everything he believes, he is collaborative (recall
that belief can be false, in which case the agent might not be competent).
– Competence (Bλ,F) is the relation between beliefs of an agent λ and true
facts. This relation defines the level of competence of λ and is related to
the quality of data an agent produces. For example, if everything an agent
believes is also true, he is competent (note that this is not the definition of
knowledge since an agent could believe in false formulae).
– Honesty (Aλ,F) is the relation between announcements made by an agent λ
and true facts. This relation defines the level of honesty of λ. For example,
if everything an agent shares on a channel is also true, then he is honest.4
Given that these three relations are over sets, they express mereological rela-
tions. We use the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) to reason on the different
“levels” of collaboration/competence/honesty and to identify which are the dif-
ferent possible relations between the three sets Aλ, Bλ and F. This ultimately
defines how many different types of agents we can theoretically consider.
RCC, as defined in [8,4], is an axiomatization of certain spatial concepts
and relations in first-order logic. In its broader definition, the RCC theory is
composed by eight axioms, and is known as RCC-8, but here we restrict to
RCC-5 by not considering tangential connections between spatial regions. We
discuss the choice of RCC-5 in more detail in Section 5.
We define parthood as the primitive binary inclusion relation ⊆, which is re-
flexive, antisymmetric and transitive. In Table 2, we define the relations of RCC-
3, RCC-5 and RCC-8, where X, Y and Z are sets (spatial regions) of formulae
and Connects with expresses the parthood relation. By applying these relations
to the pairs (Aλ,Bλ), (Bλ,F) and (Aλ,F) we can distinguish between different
levels of collaboration, competence, and honesty. Every tuple representing the
4 Note here that honesty is not necessary related to correctness. In fact, we define an
agent as honest if he asserts the truth even if he does not believe in what he asserts.
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Table 2. RCC-3, RCC-5, and RCC-8 relations between spatial regions X, Y and Z
R
C
C
-3
R
C
C
-5
R
C
C
-8
Name Notation Definition
Connects with C (X ,Y ) X ⊆ Y
Disconnected from ¬C (X ,Y ) X 6⊆ Y
Part of P(X ,Y ) ∀Z C (Z ,X )→ C (Z ,Y )
Overlaps O(X ,Y ) ∃Z P(Z ,X ) ∧ P(Z ,Y ) Overlaps Not Equal ONE(X ,Y ) O(X ,Y ) ∧ ¬EQ(X ,Y )   Equal to EQ(X ,Y ) P(X ,Y ) ∧ P(Y ,X )   DiscRete from DR(X ,Y ) ¬O(X ,Y )  Partial-Overlap PO(X ,Y ) O(X ,Y ) ∧ ¬P(X ,Y ) ∧ ¬P(Y ,X ) Proper-part-of PP(X ,Y ) P(X ,Y ) ∧ ¬P(Y ,X ) Proper-part-of-inverse PPi(X ,Y ) P(Y ,X ) ∧ ¬P(X ,Y ) Externally Connected EC (X ,Y ) C (X ,Y ) ∧ ¬O(X ,Y ) Tangential PP TPP(X ,Y ) PP(X ,Y ) ∧ ∃Z [EC (Z ,X ),EC (Z ,Y )] Tangential PPi TPPi(X ,Y ) TPP(Y ,X ) Non-tangential PP NTPP(X ,Y ) PP(X ,Y ) ∧ ¬∃Z [EC (Z ,X ),EC (Z ,Y )] Non-tangential PPi NTPPi(X ,Y ) NTPP(Y ,X )
combination of the three relations defines a different type of agent.
Agent = 〈RCC51 (Aλ,Bλ), RCC52 (Bλ,F), RCC53 (F,Aλ)〉
where RCC51 , RCC52 and RCC53 are relations in RCC-5. As we discuss in
Section 5, some combinations of RCC51 , RCC52 and RCC53 are topologically
incorrect.
4 Categorization of Agents
We now consider the details of every RCC-5 relation between each pair of Aλ,
Bλ and F and we define 15 different prejudices. Our list is complete with respect
to RCC-5, i.e., no other relations can be considered. We will use roman numerals
to identify the new rules we introduce, whereas the decimals for the rules were
already defined in [2].
4.1 Collaboration
Sincere PP(Aλ,Bλ). A sincere agent λ is defined by the proper part of his
announcements with respect to his beliefs. More formally, for any propositional
formula ϕ,
if T∗[λ : ϕ] then B[λ : ϕ] ,
where ∗ identifies one of the two modalities in MCL, i.e., ∗ ∈ {2,3}.
This type of agent announces only what he believes (⇒) but does not an-
nounce everything he believes (6⇐). As already defined in [2], we can negate the
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formula of a sincere agent and provide deduction rules to define when an agent
is not sincere as follows. For a non-sincere agent λ5, there exists a propositional
formula ϕ such that
T∗[λ : ϕ] and ∼ B[λ : ϕ] .
We can then define rules that formalize that if an agent asserts, even only once,
something that he does not believe in, then he is non-sincere:
T3[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.41 −(WS)λ
[I.−(WS)] T2[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]R.I −(SS)λ [I.−(SS)]
As we discussed in Section 2.3, the notion of weak and strong is only applied
to the notion of collaborative agent in MCL. We avoid this asymmetry and we
introduce the notion of weak and strong for all the prejudices involving a relation
with announcements. This explains why we have now used WS in R.41 instead
of S of MCL (as in Fig. 1). We extend the elimination rules accordingly:
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WS)λ
R.II ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WS)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (SS)λ
R.III ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SS)]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WS)λ
R.36
B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(WS)]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (SS)λ
R.IV
B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(SS)]
Collaborative PPi(Aλ,Bλ). Symmetrically to a sincere agent, a collaborative
agent λ is defined by the proper part of his beliefs with respect to his announce-
ments: for any propositional formula ϕ,
if B[λ : ϕ] then T∗[λ : ϕ] .
This type of agent announces everything he believes (⇒) but what he says is not
only what he believes ( 6⇐). Hence, some of the announcements are intentionally
against his beliefs (these announcements might be accidentally true facts but
we will discuss this case later in this section). If we negate the definition of
collaborative, we obtain that if an λ’s belief has not been announced (i.e., there
exists ϕ such that B[λ : ϕ] and ∼ T∗[ϕ : λ]), then λ is not collaborative.
As for the sincere agent, we define strong and weak prejudice with 2 and 3,
respectively:
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 −(WCl)λ
[I.−(WCl)] B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]R.40 −(SCl)λ [I.−(SCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WCl)λ
R.34
T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (SCl)λ
R.35
T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SCl)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WCl)λ
R.V ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (SCl)λ
R.VI ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SCl)]
5 Slightly abusing notation, we are using λ both for a sincere and non-sincere agent.
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Fair EQ(Aλ,Bλ). A fair agent λ is defined by the equality between the sets of
his announcements and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
T∗[λ : ϕ] if and only if B[λ : ϕ] .
Hence, a fair agent is an agent who believes in everything he announces (⇒) and
who announces only what he believes (⇐). As before, in order to give the rules
for MCL, we first negate the definition of the fair agent. For a non-fair agent λ,
there exists a propositional formula ϕ such that
(∼ T∗[λ : ϕ] and B[λ : ϕ]) or (∼ B[λ : ϕ] and T∗[λ : ϕ]) .
The left and right disjuncts are exactly the definitions of PPi and PP, respec-
tively. Hence, the introduction and elimination rules have been already consid-
ered in the previous two cases.
Saboteur PO(Aλ,Bλ). A saboteur agent λ is defined by the partial overlap of
his announcements with respect to his beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
B[λ : ϕ] or T∗[λ : ϕ] .
This type of agent may announce something that he believes but also that he
does not believe, or does not announce something he believes.
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.VII −(WI)λ
[I.−(WI)] ∼ B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]R.VIII −(SI)λ [I.−(SI)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (SI)λ
R.IX
B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(SI)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (SI)λ
R.X
B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(SI)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WI)λ
R.XI
T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WI)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WI)λ
R.XII
T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WI)]
Braggart DR(Aλ,Bλ). A braggart agent λ is defined by the discrete-from rela-
tion between his announcements and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
∼ T∗[λ : ϕ] or ∼ B[λ : ϕ] .
This agent only announces what he does not believe and he does not announce
what he believes. Reasoning on the negated definition (i.e., on a non-braggart
agent λ for which there exists a propositional formula ϕ such that T∗[λ :
ϕ] and B[λ : ϕ]), we can define that if (at least once) the agent states some-
thing he believes in, then he is non-braggart.
T3[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ϕ]
R.XIII −(WB)λ
[I.−(WB)] T2[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ϕ]R.XIV −(SB)λ [I.−(SB)]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (SB)λ
R.XV ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SB)]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (SB)λ
R.XVI ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SB)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WB)λ
R.XVII ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WB)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WB)λ
R.XVIII ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WB)]
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4.2 Competence
Competent PP(Bλ,F). An agent’s beliefs are a subset of the true formulae.
Hence, all the agent’s beliefs are facts but there may be true formulae “out”
of his beliefs. An agent λ is competent if, for every propositional formula ϕ,
if B[λ : ϕ] then ϕ ∈ F.
B[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.38 −(Co)λ [I. −(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λ
R.33 ϕ
[E. +(Co)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λ
R.XIX ¬ϕ [E. +(Co)]
Omniscient PPi(Bλ,F). An agent λ is omniscient if the set of formulae he
believes is a superset of the actually true formulae: for any propositional formula
ϕ, if ϕ ∈ F then B[λ : ϕ].
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ϕ
R.37 −(O)λ [I. −(O)]
ϕ + (O)λ
R.32
B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(O)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (O)λ
R.XX ¬ϕ [E. +(O)]
Wise EQ(Bλ,F). A wise agent λ is defined by the equality between the sets of
his beliefs and facts, i.e., he only believes in true formulae and knows all the
true facts: for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈ F if and only if B[λ : ϕ]. The
rules generated are exactly the rules of PPi and PP.
Incompetent PO(Bλ,F). An incompetent agent λ is defined by the partial
overlap of his beliefs with the true facts: for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈
F or B[λ : ϕ]. This type of agent believes in true and false formulae, and there
exist facts that he does not believe in, but he won’t believe a false formula ϕ.
¬ϕ ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.XXI −(In)λ [I. −(In)]
¬ϕ + (In)λ
R.XXII
B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(In)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (In)λ
R.XXIII ϕ
[E.+(In)]
Ignorant DR(Bλ,F). An ignorant agent λ is defined by the discrete-from rela-
tion between true formulae and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈
F or ∼ B[λ : ϕ]. Therefore, this agent only believes in false formulae.
ϕ B[λ : ϕ]
R.XXIV −(Ig)λ [I. −(Ig)]
ϕ + (Ig)λ
R.XXV ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(Ig)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (Ig)λ
R.XXVI ¬ϕ [E.+(Ig)]
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4.3 Honesty
Honest PP(Aλ,F). An agent is honest if every formula he asserts is a fact, and
the agent’s assertion are a subset of the true formulae: for any propositional
formula ϕ, if ϕ then T∗[λ : ϕ].
ϕ ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.XXVII
-(WH)λ
[I. -(WH)]
ϕ ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.XXVIII
-(SH)λ
[I.-(SH) ]
ϕ + (WH)λ
R.XXIX
T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WH)]
ϕ + (SH)λ
R.XXX
T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SH)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WH)λ
R.XXXI ¬ϕ [E.+(WH)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (SH)λ
R.XXXII ¬ϕ [E.+(SH)]
Oracle PPi(Aλ,F). An agent λ is an oracle if, for any propositional formula ϕ,
if T∗[λ : ϕ] then ϕ ∈ F.
T3[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.XXXIII
X
[I. -(WOr) ]
T2[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.XXXIV
X
[I.-(SOr) ]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WOr)λ
R.XXXV ϕ
[E.+(WOr)]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (SOr)λ
R.XXXVI ϕ
[E.+(SOr)]
¬ϕ + (WOr)λ
R.XXXVII ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WOr)]
¬ϕ + (SOr)λ
R.XXXVIII ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SOr)]
Right EQ(Aλ,F). An agent λ is right if, for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈
F if and only if T∗[λ : ϕ]. We omit the rules since they are the same as for PP
and PPi.
Incorrect PO(Aλ,F). An agent λ is incorrect if, for any propositional formula
ϕ, ϕ ∈ F or T∗[λ : ϕ]. The announcements of this type of agent might be true
or false, and he only announces part of the facts (i.e., a subset of the facts will
never be announced by him).
¬ϕ ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.XXXIX −(WIr)λ
[I. -(WIr) ]
¬ϕ ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.XL −(SIr)λ
[I.-(SIr) ]
¬ϕ + (WIr)λ
R.XLI
T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WIr)]
¬ϕ + (SIr)λ
R.XLII
T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SIr)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WIr)λ
R.XLIII ϕ
[E.+(WIr)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (SIr)λ
R.XLIV ϕ
[E.+(SIr)]
False DR(Aλ,F). A false agent λ is defined by the discrete-form relation between
true formulae and his assertions, i.e., for any propositional formula ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈
F or ∼ T∗[λ : ϕ]. In other words, everything he announces is false.
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ϕ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.XLV −(WF )λ
[I.−(WF ) ] ϕ T2[λ : ϕ]R.XLVI −(SF )λ [I.−(SF )]
ϕ + (WF )λ
R.XLVII ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WF )]
ϕ + (SF )λ
R.XLVIII ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(SF )]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WF )λ
R.XLIX ¬ϕ [E.+(WF )]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (SF )λ
R.L ¬ϕ [E.+(SF )]
5 On the Topology of MAS
In this section, we justify the use of RCC-5 instead of RCC-3 or RCC-8, and
discuss the relation between the topology we consider and the agent types.
5.1 RCC-3, RCC-5, and RCC-8
As already mentioned in Section 3, there exist three different types of RCC, based
on the number of topological relations considered: RCC-3, RCC-5, and RCC-8.
RCC-3 considers the three different topological relations listed in Table 2: ONE ,
EQ , and DR. The topological relations EQ and DR are the same as in RCC-5
(see Table 2), whereas ONE defines the overlap relation between two regions
with the additional constraint that the regions cannot be fully overlapping (i.e.,
they cannot be two exact copies of the same region).
The relation ONE in RCC-3 is detailed in RCC-5 with the relations PP ,
PPi , and PO . Hence, considering RCC-5 instead of RCC-3 results in a more
accurate and expressive categorization of agents. However, the same reasoning
cannot be applied to RCC-8. In fact, even if RCC-8 is more detailed than RCC-
5 as it considers more topological relations, the additional topological relations
considered by RCC-8 cannot be applied for the categorization of agents in MCL.
As showed in Table 2, RCC-8 considers tangential connections, where, informally,
two tangential regions are near enough so that no other region can fit between
the two (without overlapping them), but are not overlapping at any point. This
is formalized by the EC relation. In addition, in RCC-8, each of the two relations
PP and PPi is detailed into tangential and non-tangential.
In our work, the elements of the three sets A, B and F are not ordered. In
other words, we are not considering the distance between those elements (or
between regions containing those elements). Hence, given any pair of (sub-)sets
between A, B and F, regardless of the sets being near or far apart between each
other, we consider them as disjoint (i.e., DR).
5.2 An Upper-bound on the Number of Different Types of Agents
Applying RCC over a finite number of sets, we obtain a definite number of
resulting combinations. Hence, applying RCC over Aλ,Bλ,F, we obtain a definite
number of different types of agents. In this section, we show the general upper
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Fig. 2. Representation of the test case
Theoretical Correct
RCC-3 33 = 27 15
RCC-5 53 = 125 54
RCC-8 83 = 512 193
Fig. 3. Number of agents with respect to
different RCC
bound on the number of different agents with respect to the type of RCC (RCC-
5, RCC-3 or RCC-8) considered.
The general formula to calculate the number of different types of agents is
r(
n
k), where r is the number of relations with arity k, between n different sets,
where re is the number of permutation of r relations over e elements with repeti-
tions, with e being the number of k-ary combinations of n sets,
(
n
k
)
. In our case,(
n
k
)
= 3 since we consider 3 sets (A,B,F), and all the relations considered in the
RCC are binary. Hence, using RCC-5 (with five different spatial relations) over
three sets, we can theoretically define up to 125 different type of agents. How-
ever, only 54 of the 125 (as showed in [4] and derived by the composition table of
RCC-5) combinations are topologically correct with respect to the definition of
the relations of RCC-5. Generalizing to all the RCCs, in Tab. 3 we calculate the
number of different agents with respect to all the variations of RCC (i.e., with
3, 5 or 8 spatial relations). Due to space limits, we omit the composition table
for RCC-3, RCC-5 and RCC-8. Hence, even if considering a different number of
sets than the three A, B and F exponentially affects the number of theoretical
agents, the application of RCC downscales that number of a factor that ranges
from 1.8 to 2.5. In addition, using RCC-5 we consider 3.6 times more (different)
types of agents than RCC-3, but using RCC-8 would allow us to consider 3.5
times more different agents.
6 Use Case
In this section, we show that both the framework and the categorization of agents
that we have given can be applied to reason about the security of CPS.
6.1 Cyber-Physical Systems
We use the term CPS to refer to systems that consist of networked embedded
systems, which are used to sense, actuate, and control physical processes. Exam-
ples of CPS include industrial water treatment facilities and power plants. CPS
have seen a rapid increase in automation and connectivity, which threatens to
increase their vulnerability to malicious attacks. Let us now use our approach
to address the problem of defining security-related attack states for CPS.
Description of the Case Study. Similarly to [9,5] we consider a CPS (depicted
in Figure 2) composed by five agents:
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Table 3. Example of attack states for the water level sensor
State of the sensor (A,B) (B,F) (A,F)
optimal EQ EQ EQ
sensor compromised EQ DR DR
communication compromised DR EQ DR
fully compromised DR DR DR
– A tank containing water.
– A controller (e.g., a PLC) that controls the water level so that the tank does
not (underflow or) overflow.
– A water level indicator (e.g., a Sensor) that communicates the readings of
the level of the water inside the tank to the PLC.
– A motorized valve and a pump that (controlled by the PLC) regulate the
inflow and outflow of water respectively.
Mapping A, B, and F to CPS. It is possible that the three sets A, B and
F contain at the same time different formulae that contain each element of the
topological space ϕ. Hence, every assertion and belief must be objective (since
it can be part of F). This implies that formulae like ϕ := highLevel(tank ,water)
cannot be considered in our reasoning since “high” is considered to be subjective.
In contrast, we can use objective formulae such as ϕ := level(tank , 20L).
When considering a CPS (and security systems in general, e.g., security pro-
tocols) as a MAS, the message exchange between different agents can be formal-
ized by means of assertions. In addition, redundant channels are often employed
to reduce security treats (or assertions are required over multiple channels as,
e.g., in two-factor authentication) and then it is fair to assume that assertions can
be done over single or multiple channels. Finally, the inspection of the memory
of any software/hardware of the CPS (supposing a white-box analysis) reveals
the actual beliefs, while the facts in a CPS are defined by the physical laws of
the physics. We can summarize our mapping as follows:
– Aλ defines the values communicated by the agent λ.
– Bλ defines the computational results of the agent λ.
– F defines the environmental values, i.e., the real values of the system.
6.2 Single-Channel Attack states
We are now in a position to show that we can directly apply our topological
categorization to any agent in our CPS. For simplicity, we first use only the
RCC-5 relations EQ and DR, and then extend our results to all RCC-5 relations.
Optimal System Status. Suppose that the tank contains 20L of water, e.g.,
level(tank , 20L) ∈ F, where level is a predicate, and tank and 20L are proposi-
tional constants. For the sake of simplicity, we also suppose that the system
is in idle (both the motorized valve and the pump are off). When the sys-
tem is not compromised, the sensor correctly computes the level of the wa-
ter in the tank (e.g., level(tank , 20L) ∈ Bsensor ) and correctly communicates
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to the PLC the computed value of water in the tank (e.g., level(tank , 20L) ∈
Asensor ). We can then define the optimal status of the sensor as the triple
〈EQ(Asensor ,Bsensor ),EQ(Bsensor ,F),EQ(Asensor ,F)〉.
System Under Attack. Suppose that the sensor is communicating wrong val-
ues to the PLC (i.e, DR(Asensor ,F)). As showed in Table 3, we have three mu-
tually exclusive cases:
1. The sensor is working properly EQ(Bsensor ,F), therefore (topologically) the
communication between the sensor and the PLC has been compromised, i.e.,
DR(Asensor ,Bsensor ).
2. The communication between the sensor and the PLC has not been com-
promised EQ(Asensor ,Bsensor ), therefore the sensor is not sending what it
computes DR(Bsensor ,F).
3. Both the communication and the sensor have been compromised.
As a consequence of the discussion in Section 5.2, between the optimal and
the fully compromised status of the sensor there must be 52 other different
statuses. Due to lack of space, we cannot go into the details of each status, but
we can generalize the attack states into three main categories, as follows:
– RCC5 (A,B) expresses the relation between the values communicated and
the ones computed by an agent.
– RCC5 (B,F) expresses the relation between the values computed and the
true environmental values.
– RCC5 (A,F) expresses the relation between the values communicated and
the true environmental values.
Defense mechanisms that check sudden changes in physical readings (for an ex-
ample of how this is defined in MAS with logical systems, see [12]) are often
adopted in CPS. To bypass the security mechanisms, during an attack, the op-
timal status will likely pass through most of the 52 intermediate statuses.
6.3 Multiple-Channel Attack States
A countermeasure often applied in CPS (but not limited to CPS) is the imple-
mentation of redundant channels. As proposed in [10], in our case study one
could implement a dedicated system that interprets the readings of the sensor
and directly closes the motorized valve if an upper threshold is reached. We can
leverage the modal operators to define such communications and to define even
more sophisticated attack states. For example, given a state Asensor ,Bsensor ,F in
MCL, we can check if one or all the channels that the sensor uses to communicate
with the PLC have been compromised, as defined in (1) and (2) respectively:
{Asensor ,Bsensor ,F} ` −(SFair )sensor (1)
{Asensor ,Bsensor ,F} ` −(WFair )sensor (2)
Based on the approach we have proposed in this paper we can formalize the
optimal/attack states of a CPS, reason on the properties of the CPS by means
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of prejudices in MCL, and obtain therefore a control upon the concept of re-
dundancy as expressed above. Our approach is not specific to CPS but can
potentially be applied to any MAS (as long as the elements of the topological
space are objective).
7 Conclusion
We proposed a topological categorization of agents for MCL using RCC5. We
defined an upper bound on the number of different agents in a MAS and we
applied our results to the security of CPS. We showed that our results can be
used to address the problem of defining attack states for CPS. We are currently
working on an implementation of our framework. We have also been extending
MCL to capture the intents of agents, which will ultimately allow us to consider
human agents in the formalization of MAS.
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